University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Lab Lunch > Formalising privacy in the applied pi-calculus

Formalising privacy in the applied pi-calculus

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The use of RFID tags in personal items, such as passports, may make it possible to track a person’s movements. Even RFID protocols that encrypt their identity may leak enough information to let an attacker trace a tag. We will first define formally unlinkability in the applied pi-calculus which in some cases makes it possible to automatically check if an RFID tag running a particular protocol is traceable. We will then show that there is a flaw in one of the e-passport’s protocols that makes it possible to trace the movements of a particular passport, without having to break the passport’s cryptographic key.

This talk is part of the Lab Lunch series.

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