University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Applied Mathematics Seminar Series > Statistics of internal equilibria: Evolutionary Game Theory meets Random Polynomial Theory

Statistics of internal equilibria: Evolutionary Game Theory meets Random Polynomial Theory

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  • UserHong Duong, University of Birmingham
  • ClockThursday 20 February 2020, 12:00-13:00
  • HouseBiosciences 301.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Fabian Spill.

Random evolutionary games, where the payoff entries are random variables, play an important role in the modelling of social and biological systems under uncertainty which is due to, for instance, the lack of information or the rapidly change of environment. As in classical game theory with the Nash equilibrium, the analysis of equilibrium points in evolutionary game theory has been of special interest because these equilibrium points provide essential understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological diversity and the maintenance of polymorphism.

In this talk, I will discuss our recent works on the statistics of the number of equilibriums in multi-player multi-strategy games. Prior methods involve solving a system of polynomial equations, thus are restricted to systems consisting of small numbers of players and/or strategies due to Abel’s impossibility theorem. By connecting to the rich theory of random polynomial theory, our approach allows overcoming this difficulty, enabling us to study general systems with arbitrarily large numbers of strategies and players.

This talk is part of the Applied Mathematics Seminar Series series.

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