University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > Privileged side-channel attacks for enclave adversaries

Privileged side-channel attacks for enclave adversaries

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Isra Ahmed.

In an increasingly connected world, hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) hold the compelling potential of securely offloading sensitive computations to untrusted remote platforms, even after they have been fully compromised by malware. With the advent of commercial solutions like Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, hardware support for such “enclaved execution” is readily available in today’s processors. However, as demonstrated in recent research, state-of-the-art commercial TEEs focus solely on architectural isolation while leaving subtle-yet-dangerous microarchitectural leakage largely out-of-scope. This talk will overview how the strengthened TEE adversary model often leads to new and unexpected attack surfaces. This ranges from new kinds of software vulnerabilities, over innovative side-channel attack vectors that abuse traditionally privileged hardware-software interfaces (e.g., page tables or interrupts), to ultimately high-profile transient execution threats that may completely dismantle TEE security guarantees (e.g., as demonstrated by the recent Foreshadow and ZombieLoad attacks).

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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