University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > FENL: an ISE to mitigate analogue micro-architectural leakage

FENL: an ISE to mitigate analogue micro-architectural leakage

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Isra Ahmed.

Ge et al. propose the augmented ISA (or aISA), a central tenet of which is the selective exposure of micro-architectural resources via a less opaque abstraction than normal. The aISA proposal is motivated by a need for control over such resources, for example to implement robust countermeasures against micro-architectural (e.g., side-channel) attack.

In this talk, we will motivate the need for then present a design for an aISA-style approach to challenges that stem from analogue micro-architectural leakage. An example would be Hamming weight leakage from fine-grained resources (e.g., pipeline registers), that a) enable certain forms of leakage and thus attack, but b) are not exposed in, and so cannot be reliably controlled via, a normal ISA .

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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