A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity

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• Ben Smyth
• Thursday 04 July 2019, 11:00-12:00
• Computer Science, Room 217.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Isra Ahmed.

Seminal work by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson delivered a verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with quadratic complexity. This talk will attempt to advance the state-of-the-art by delivering a voting system with equivalent security and linear complexity. We will begin by establishing intuition as to how coercion resistance and verifiability can be achieved, informally establish an impossibility result, and then delve into the details of the new verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system. The presentation will stray away from the traditional slide-based style and will make heavy use of whiteboards. The audience are encouraged to interact and challenged to find attacks.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Science, Room 217
• Computer Security Seminars

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