How to prevent thieves from stealing your car while you're

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• Dr Dave Singelée
• Thursday 07 March 2019, 11:00-12:00
• Computer Science, The Sloman Lounge (UG).

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Mani Bhesania.

Distance bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols typically combine physical properties of the communication channel with cryptographic challenge-response schemes. Distance bounding protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. Most important are relay attacks, where a malicious third party aims to convince the verifier that he is the legitimate prover by relaying all communication between the verifier and the prover. Recently, car thieves have successfully deployed this technique in practice to steal cars. Although distance bounding protocols conceptually solve the issue of relay attacks, there are not yet widely used in practice. The main bottleneck is that it is technically very challenging to implement a secure and accurate distance bounding protocol. In this presentation, I will give an overview of several implementations of distance bounding protocols that have recently been proposed in the literature and discuss their main limitations.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Science, The Sloman Lounge (UG)
• Computer Security Seminars
• computer sience

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