Robots, Emotions, and Epistemic Rational Assessability

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• Matilde Aliffi and Helen Ryland (Doctoral Researchers, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham)
• Monday 28 January 2019, 11:00-12:00
• Computer Science, The Sloman Lounge (UG).

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Hector Basevi.

Host: Prof. Aaron Sloman

Abstract: There is a current lack of philosophical research on whether robots could have emotions. In this talk, we argue that the idea that a robot could have emotions is more plausible than currently assumed. We will demonstrate this by giving examples of robots that appear to have some of the emotional components that are usually involved in human emotional experiences. This opens up new philosophical questions specifically about the rational status of these robots’ emotions. We claim that if a robot can have emotions, or “robot-like emotions”, then these emotions may be open to epistemic rational assessment.

This talk is part of the Artificial Intelligence and Natural Computation seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Artificial Intelligence and Natural Computation seminars
• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Science, The Sloman Lounge (UG)
• computer sience

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