LeiA: A Lightweight Authentication Protocol for CAN

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• Andreea Radu (University of Birmingham)
• Thursday 01 September 2016, 11:00-12:00
• Sloman Lounge, School of Computer Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Andreea Radu.

Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single vehicle component is compromised, it is often possible to take full control of the vehicle. This paper proposes LeiA, a lightweight authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network (CAN). This protocol allows critical vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to authenticate each other providing compartmentalisation and preventing a number of attacks e.g., where a compromised CD player is able to accelerate the vehicle. LeiA is designed to run under the stringent time and bandwidth constraints of automotive applications and is backwards compatible with existing vehicle infrastructure. The protocol is suitable to be implemented using lightweight cryptographic primitives yet providing appropriate security levels by limiting the usage of every key in the system. The security of LeiA is proven under the unforgeability assumption of the MAC scheme under chosen message attacks (UF-CMA).

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Security Seminars
• Sloman Lounge, School of Computer Science
• computer sience

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