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Internet Voting on Insecure Platforms

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Andreea Radu.

Due to massive hacking and the Snowden leak, the public at large is aware that modern computers and ``secure’’ communication over the Internet cannot be fully trusted. The research on booth based voting (where one can trust the voting equipment) has been going on for 35 years. However, the legislature and the public want voting over the Internet. In such setting, to be realistic, one has to assume the voter’s platform might be hacked.

Chaum introduced code voting as a solution for using a possibly infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic voting application. He trusted the postal mail system. However, a conspiracy between the mail system and the recipient of the cast ballots breaks privacy. Moreover Chaum’s system is also unpopular because the voting procedure is different from what is currently used.

To deal with these problems, we consider a t-bounded passive adversary and we remove the trust in the mail system. We propose both single and multi-seat elections, using PSMT (Perfectly Secure Message Transmission) protocols where with the help of visual aids, humans can carry out mod 10 addition correctly with a 99% degree of accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX based on the combinatorics of set systems.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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