Side-Channel Attacks on SHA-1-based Product Authentication ICs

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• David Oswald (University of Birmingham)
• Thursday 12 November 2015, 11:00-12:00
• Room 245, School of Computer Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Gurchetan Grewal.

To prevent product counterfeiting, a common practice is to cryptographically authenticate system components (e.g., inkjet cartridges, batteries, or spare parts) using dedicated ICs. We analysed the security of two wide-spread examples for such devices, the DS28E01 and DS2432 SHA -1-based authentication ICs manufactured by Maxim Integrated. We show that the 64-bit secret can be fully extracted using non-invasive side-channel analysis with 1,800 and 1,200 traces, respectively.

Doing so, we present the, to our knowledge, first side-channel attack on real-world devices employing an HMAC -like construction. The results highlight that there is an evident need for protection against implementation attacks also for the case of low-cost devices like product authentication ICs.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Security Seminars
• Room 245, School of Computer Science
• computer sience

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