University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > Electronic Voting: Introduction, privacy and verifiability definitions, and Helios case study 2/2

Electronic Voting: Introduction, privacy and verifiability definitions, and Helios case study 2/2

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Matthijs Melissen.

Electronic voting systems used for real-world, large-scale public elections place extensive trust in software and hardware. Unfortunately, instead of being trustworthy, many systems are vulnerable to attacks that could bring election outcomes into disrepute. In this talk, I will show how cryptography can be used to secure the electronic voting systems we use in real-life, eliminating the need for blind trust. The talk will be split into two parts:

  • The first part @ 1100 will present an informal introduction to electronic voting, and will review the Helios electronic voting system, highlighting known attacks.
  • The second part @ 1330 will present computational definitions of ballot secrecy and verifiability, and show that Helios can be patched to satisfy these definitions.

The talk is based upon papers with David Bernhard, Michael Clarkson, VĂ©ronique Cortier, and Steven Frink (see http://bensmyth.com/publications.php for details).

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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