University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > Virtual Multi-Protocol Attacks in Non-Repudiation Protocols

Virtual Multi-Protocol Attacks in Non-Repudiation Protocols

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Vincent Cheval.

We give a formal definition of the security property of non-repudiation, and study which conditions this definition must contain. It is well-known that agents need to restrict the use of their key material to a limited set of protocols if multiple security protocols are executed in parallel. We identify an additional requirement, which states that agents should also know about other agents which keys are used for which protocols. When this requirement is not satisfied, a new class of attacks, called virtual multi-protocol attacks, arises. In such attacks, the adversary executes a protocol honestly, and afterwards falsely denies that he has been executing this protocol, abusing the lack of knowledge of the attacked agent. Virtual multi-protocol attacks can be prevented by having the public key infrastructure not only link keys to agents, but also to the protocol for which the key is used.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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