University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > Dev-Vote: Electronic voting on an untrusted platform

Dev-Vote: Electronic voting on an untrusted platform

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Vincent Cheval.

Two fundamental properties of electronic voting protocols are vote privacy and vote integrity. What is more, these properties need to be ensured even in the presence of malicious parties that may tamper with the voter’s choice at any moment between voting and vote counting. An on-going thread of research over the last few years has been in minimizing the trust assumptions that are necessary to ensure these properties.

In remote voting, a particularly delicate point of trust is the voting machine. A malicious voting machine could potentially invalidate a voter’s vote or compromise her privacy. In this paper, we propose a remote voting protocol that uses a simple hardware token to allow voters to securely cast votes. We let the untrusted voting machine encrypt the candidates, but the voter’s choice is made on the hardware token in a way that neither hardware token nor the voting machine learns the vote. Encrypted candidates are audited by the server, to prevent cheating by the voting machine. This helps to distribute the trust across different components, with realisable trust assumptions. Moreover, we propose a new zero knowledge proof to verify the integrity of the server’s computations without revealing the votes to the untrusted platform.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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