University of Birmingham > Talks@bham > Computer Security Seminars > Privacy issues: from protocols to applications

Privacy issues: from protocols to applications

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Security protocols are nowadays used in many of our daily-life applications, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but they become so complex that modular techniques have to be developed. We propose a generic composition result (in a Dolev-Yao model) to compose protocols with respect to privacy-type properties expressed using a notion of equivalence. We consider arbitrary primitives modeled using an equational theory, and a rich process algebra close to the applied pi calculus. Relying on this generic composition result, we are then able to derive some privacy-type properties (e.g. anonymity, unlinkability) of a whole application from a privacy analysis performed on each sub-protocol individually. As an application, we consider parallel composition and the case of key-exchange protocols. We illustrate our techniques on the mobile telecommunications application.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

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