Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting

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• Gurchetan S. Grewal and Mark Ryan
• Friday 10 May 2013, 11:00-12:00
• Room 217, School of Computer Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Vincent Cheval.

The balance between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and usability remains unresolved in remote electronic voting despite significant research over the last few years. We propose a change of perspective, replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a new requirement of coercionevidence: there should be public evidence of the amount of coercion that has taken place during a particular execution of the voting system. We provide a formal definition of coercion-evidence that has two parts. Firstly, there should be a coercion-evidence test that can be performed against the bulletin board to accurately determine the degree of coercion that has taken place in any given run. Secondly, we require coercer independence, that is the ability of the voter to follow the protocol without being detected by the coercer. To show how coercion-evidence can be achieved, we propose a new remote voting scheme, Caveat Coercitor, and we prove that it satisfies coercion-evidence. Moreover, Caveat Coercitor makes weaker trust assumptions than other remote voting systems, such as JCJ /Civitas and Helios, and has better usability properties.

This talk is part of the Computer Security Seminars series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Computer Science Departmental Series
• Computer Science Distinguished Seminars
• Computer Security Seminars
• Room 217, School of Computer Science
• computer sience

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